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THIRD WAY  VALUES  AND  POST-SCHOOL  EDUCATION  POLICY 
Terry Hyland, Faculty of Arts, Science & Education, Bolton Institute, 
Chadwick St., Bolton BL2 1JW  (t,hyland@bolton.ac.uk). 
 Abstract                                    
Analyses of emerging  New Labour policy and practice in the post-compulsory education 
and training sector have been centrally concerned with the role of  'third way' values and 
politics in the formulation and development of projects and initiatives.  Alternative 
interpretations of the ‘third way’  conception are examined and located against the 
background of some flagship schemes, particularly the New Deal Welfare to Work and 
the University for Industry learndirect initiatives.  It is concluded that policies influenced 
by third way  notions involve more rather than less state involvement and centralism 
than neo-liberal strategies of the past.  This New Labour statism - arguably different from 
both Old Left and New Right centralism – could, conceivably, be justified in terms of 
achieving the socio-ethical strands of  current policy concerned with social inclusion and 
communitarian approaches to the distribution of educational goods and services in the 
face of the forces of globalization.  
Introduction 
      The election of the Labour government in 1997 not only brought about a new political 
administration but also, as Fairclough (2000:21) notes, a whole new:  
         vision of the world, partly actual, partly potential.  It includes 
         representations of the economy, of work, of crime, of the family, 
         and so forth.  It also includes representations of politics and 
         government as ways of changing the world - specifically of what 
         is claimed to be a 'new politics', the politics of the 'Third Way' . 
 
The attempt to steer a course between a ‘neo-liberal model and a social capitalist model’ 
of politics is forming itself as the ‘intellectual bedrock’ (Hodgson & Spours,1999:.8) of the 
New Labour project.   Halpin (1999) argues that the new ‘third way’ (TW) politics offers 
real opportunities for transcending the old discredited polarities and generating genuine 
political alternatives.  Although the new politics - partly because it is still being distilled 
and refined as emergent New Labour policy translates ideals and theory into practice - 
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has proved difficult to pin down, there now seems to be enough exposition, analysis and 
critical discourse  to attempt to locate the key themes within an educational framework.  
Central to the debate - in addition to the New Labour policy documents - are the writings 
of Giddens (1998,2000), his critics and other commentators on the developing debate in 
this sphere.  This literature will be analysed with a view to constructing a coherent 
account of TW politics and values before examining the implications for post-compulsory 
education and training (PCET).   
    In the background, and sometimes the foreground, will be the key question of whether 
the so-called new politics - incorporating discourses on the economy, culture, and 
society in general, as well as education -  really does mark a new direction and break 
with the past or whether current trends are, essentially, still  'dominated by neo-
liberalism' (Hill,2000:11).  The principal line of of argument is that – although neo-
liberalism does, contrary to much popular belief (Gray,1998; Scott,2000), involve 
elements of state intervention – TW values and politics require more centralist and statist 
control of education and the economy than the Conservative politics of the 1980s and 
1990s.  Moreover, although the socially inclusive elements of  current lifelong learning 
policies are generally subordinate to economistic aims, the social purposes of education 
and training have an integral place in TW politics in a way which makes them 
distinctively different from earlier forms of neo-liberalism.    
Third Way Values and Politics 
     Although not in the fullest sense one of the classical 'essentially contested' concepts 
(such as freedom, religion and democracy) discussed by Gallie (1964), TW 
constructions are - like Wittgenstein's famous analysis of games in terms of 'family 
resemblances' (1974:31-2) - clearly subject to a number of overlapping and criss-
crossing interpretations.  Giddens (1998:vii) begins his discussion by explaining that the 
TW 'is if no particular significance in and of itself' and 'has been used many times before 
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in the past history of social democracy'.  Kellner (1998:15) accepts the social-
democractic origins and claims that the basic strategy can best be captured by the idea 
of 'mutualism' which 'offers a way out of the sterile argument between state ownership 
and private enterprise'.  In a similar vein Leadbetter (1998:15) explains that the 'central 
ethic of the Third Way is simple and traditional: co-operative self-improvement'.  He goes 
on to elaborate the approach in terms of a politics which: 
                       encourages people to recognise their shared needs and the potential for 
                       shared solutions.  It promotes co-operation and collaboration, as well as 
                       ambition and striving.  This is not wishy-washy political correctness. The 
                       most knowledge-intensive sectors of the economy, software and bio- 
                       technology, thrive on a mix of competition and collaboration. 
 
    For Giddens (1998:64-5) the 'overall aim of third way politics should be to help citizens 
pilot their way through the major revolutions of our time: globalization, transformations in 
personal life and our relationship to nature'; third way politics 'looks for a new 
relationship between the individual and the community, a redefinition of rights and 
obligations'. This is followed by helpful lists (the listing of positive and favourable 
concepts and values - such as 'fairness, justice, the equal worth and dignity of all' - often 
without elaboration or justification is, as Fairclough notes [2000:46,53], a key 
characteristic of New Labour discourse) of  TW values and principles.   Values include 
'equality, freedom as autonomy, no rights without responsibilities and no authority 
without democracy' ,and the 'third way programme' incorporates the 'radical centre, an 
active civil society, the democratic family, the new mixed economy, positive welfare and 
the cosmopolitan nation' (Giddens,1998:66,70).  The ultimate aim of the programme is 
the 'social investment state' which 'defines equality as inclusion and inequality as 
exclusion'(ibid:102). 
     More recently, in response to a host of criticisms of his original thesis - principally, 
that the TW is an 'amorphous political project, difficult to pin down and lacking in 
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direction' that it 'fails to sustain the proper outlook of the left and...lapses into a form of 
conservatism',  that it 'accepts the basic framework of neoliberalism, especially as 
concerns the global marketplace', and that it 'has no distinctive economic policy, other 
than allowing the market to rule the roost'(Giddens,2000:22-25) - Giddens re-iterates the 
'fundamentals of third way politics' (ibid:50-54).  The key defining features are expressed 
in terms of : 
i) an acceptance of the 'logic of 1989 and after' that the old left-right divisions are no 
longer feasible or useful; 
ii) a belief that the 'three key areas of power - government, the economy and the 
communities of civil society- all need to be constrained in the interests of social solidarity 
and social justice'; 
iii) the construction of a 'new social contract based on the theorem 'no rights without 
responsibilities'; 
iv) the development of a 'wide-ranging supply side policy which seeks to reconcile 
economic growth mechanisms with structural reform of the welfare state'; 
v) the creation of a 'diversified society based upon egalitarian principles'; 
vi) taking globalization seriously by seeking to 'transform existing global institutions and 
supporting the creation of new ones'. 
The Third Way and the Global Economy 
    The last point concerning globalization requires special emphasis and attention since 
it is a central theme – not just in Giddens’ arguments about education and the economy 
– but in New Labour’s general lifelong learning policy.  A distinctive feature of TW politics 
is that - whether the subject is education, health, crime or welfare - the agenda is always 
determined by economic considerations generally and the global market in particular (in 
addition, of course, to the considerable political and ideological legacy of the New Right; 
Hodgson & Spours,1999).  Thus, although political points may appear to be ostensibly 
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about welfare, the family, community or social inclusion, the debate sooner or later 
returns to the impact of the global economy on all aspects of  life in Britain.  Education 
policy statements provide excellent examples of this tendency.  Introducing  the 
government's radically new policies on lifelong learning, the Secretary of State for 
education and employment observed that: 
                  Learning is the key to prosperity – for each of us as individuals, as 
                    well as for the nation as a whole.  Investment in human capital will 
                    be the foundation of success in the knowledge-based global economy 
                    of the twenty-first century…As well as securing our economic future 
                    learning …helps make ours a civilised society, develops the spiritual  
                    side of our lives and promotes active citizenship  (DfEE,1998a:.7). 
 
The ordering of priorities here leaves us with little doubt about the primary purposes of 
developing the learning society.  Similarly, in the report of the National Advisory Council 
for Education and Training Targets (NACETT) we are informed that the: 
                  primary purpose of the new targets is to make Britain competitive 
                  internationally.  But they will also play a vital role in promoting 
                  social cohesion.  Those two goals need not be in conflict with each 
                  other; sustained economic success, for example, is essential if we 
                  are to reduce dependency on the State and make work pay 
                  (NACETT,1998:.5; original emphasis). 
        
Thus, although economistic considerations are clearly primary, the social purposes of 
education and training are invariably attached to competitiveness arguments in a way 
which emphasises their interdependence. Admittedly the social capital perspective is 
often presented in a rather utilitarian and technicist fashion as in the Secretary of State’s 
introduction to the recent report of the National Skills Task Force.  Mr Blunkett observes 
that: 
               As we move into the new century, skills and learning must become 
               the key determinants of the economic prosperity and social cohesion 
               of our country.  Knowledge and skills are now the key drivers of 
               innovation and change.  Economic performance depends increasingly 
               on talent and creativity.  And in this new economy, it is education and 
               skills which shape the opportunities and rewards available to individuals. 
               Higher skills bring better prospects and higher earnings (DfEE,2000a:3). 
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    When the Secretary of State tells us later that ‘equality of opportunity is not simply a 
moral objective – it is an economic imperative’(ibid.) , we are left in no doubt that 
references to moral and social values are merely subordinate, and that economic 
considerations have overriding priority in the lifelong learning plans.  In the social 
cohesion envisaged here, people seem to relate to each other – not primarily as 
neighbours, community members or citizens – but as (potential) owners/recipients of 
employability skills striving for survival in the harsh climate of the global market.  In fact, 
the reality-rhetoric gap is at its widest here since the scramble for security as new 
technology makes traditional occupational knowledge and skills redundant leads to, as 
Gray (1998) puts it, the ‘re-proletarianization of much of the industrial working class and 
the de-bourgeoisification of the former middle classes’(p.72).  Such developments make 
the goal of social cohesion all the more difficult to achieve. The reality often is, as Gray 
reminds us, that:   
              In very country the new and more volatile strain of capitalism is 
               transforming economic life.  The impact of anarchic global markets 
               on the economic cultures of continental Europe institutionalizes 
               high levels of structural unemployment.  In these societies the 
               principal source of social division is unequal access to work (p.74). 
 
    All this goes to explain the dominance of economistic interpretations of all the current 
problems facing Britain, particularly the all-encompassing project of fighting social 
exclusion (or promoting its opposite).   For Fairclough (2000:65), the ‘long standing 
Labour Party objective of greater  equality has been displaced in New Labour politics by 
the objective of greater social inclusion’.  If we add to this the fact that models of social 
inclusion are almost always constructed  in terms of  the knowledge, skills, values and 
cultural deficiencies of excluded groups, then the importance of the educational strand of 
TW politics is brought to the fore. 
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Locating the Third Way 
    Arguments which seek to show that the TW  either is or is not like the Old Left or New 
Right politics leave themselves open to charges of  pedantic irrelevance which only 
supporters or critics of those positions can have an interest in.  It could be argued that 
the only thing that matters is the impact that New Labour (or any other government) 
policies have on education, the economy or society.  However, this view is itself far too 
simplistic since the policy-making is mediated and forged through the language and 
discourse of political debate.  Fairclough’s (2000) painstaking analysis of New Labour 
language and policy discourse, for instance, makes much of the ‘reality-rhetoric 
dichotomy’ (arguably, a feature of all political language) in  every sphere of activity.  Yet 
the point of analysis is not simply to demonstrate linguistic discrepancies for, as 
Fairclough reminds us, the ‘reality-rhetoric dichotomy provides a basis for political 
contestation and resistance’.  He goes on to argue that: 
             Part of what makes politics possible and inevitable is the fact that gaps 
             arise between rhetoric and reality and become visible to people.  The 
             politics of language, the politics of the gaps between reality and rhetoric, 
             is a fundamental part of politics (155). 
                 
    Although all politics might be said to consist of compromises between different 
positions, TW strategies are, for the most part, exclusively of this nature since their 
essence is constructed through locating a middle way between or synthesis of rival or 
oppositional perspectives.  Consequently, in addition to the list-making tendency noted 
earlier, the TW  ‘is pervasively respresented in the discourse of New Labour as 
reconciling themes which have been seen as irreconcileable’ (ibid:44).   Giddens initially 
seemed to prefer the oppositional discourse (which, like list-making, lends itself well to 
sloganizing_ such as ‘no rights without responsibilities’, ‘no authority without democracy’ 
(1998:66) but now uses the modifying and conciliatory language which generates 
conceptions involving the integration and connection of different ideas.  This approach 
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produces notions such as  ‘education is the main public investment that can foster both 
economic efficiency and social cohesion’, the third way ‘concerns itself with equality and 
pluralism’ and – in response to globalization – the promotion of ‘global integration’ in 
pursuit of a ‘healthy global order [which] would achieve a balance between government, 
the economy and civil society’(Giddens,2000:73,120,123; original italics).   
    Fairclough (2000:44) offers some instructive examples of a similar kind from Blair’s 
pamphlets and speeches: 
            Patriotism and internationalism; rights and responsibilities; the promotion 
             of enterprise and the attack on poverty and discrimination…Cutting 
             corporation tax to help businesses and introducing a minimum wage to 
             help the lowest paid…Significant extra resources into priority areas such 
             as health and education and tough and prudent limits on overall government 
             spending.  Investment and reform in the public sector.  A key player in the 
             EU and hostile to unnecessary centralisation. 
 
Sometimes the stress is on reconciling oppositional themes and sometimes on going 
beyond such outmoded divisions (typically through ‘partnerships’ of various kinds – 
another key New Labour theme) but, as Fairclough argues, whatever the strategy it is 
important to note the gaps between rhetoric and reality in policy and legislation. 
Post-Compulsory Education and the Third Way 
     Apart from an obsession with distinguishing New Labour education policy from that of 
the previous administration (Coffield,1998), post-1997 strategies have been shaped, in 
the main, by TW concepts and economistic discourse linked to global market themes.  
Two key policy developments – the University for Industry (UfI) and the New Deal 
Welfare to Work (WtW) schemes –  represent paradigm cases in this respect. 
     Although the UfI Pathfinder Prospectus (DfEE,1998b) was published in 1998 as a 
prelude to the official launch of the UfI learndirect centres in Autumn 2000, the original 
blueprint dates back to joint research and development (supported by New Labour 
politicians such as Gordon Brown) by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and 
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the University of Sunderland in 1995/96 (Milner,1998).  The new organisation is intended 
to perform the functions of an ‘impartial broker’ seeking to connect individuals and 
companies to learning/training programmes  rather than being a principal provider, 
though the UfI did plan to ’commission initially a limited number of flagship packages in 
areas of strategic importance’(DfEE,1998b:27).  In order to achieve its two main 
objectives of stimulating the demand for learning amongst employers and employees 
(particularly those in small firms; Matlay & Hyland,1999) and improving access to and 
availability of  learning opportunities, the UfI makes extensive use of information and 
communications technology (ICT) to connect with learning networks of all kinds.  There 
is now a national freephone helpline to supplement the work of UfI learndirect regional 
centres around the country working to stimulate interest in education and training 
amongst employers and individuals (Twining,2000a).  
     The UfI  might have been designed solely by reference to Giddens’ TW manual of 
practical politics.  All the key ingredients are there.  In the original UfI blueprint devised 
by Hillman (1997), three broad strategies to meet the challenges for lifelong learning 
were considered: laissez-faire (free market), dirigisme (state direction) and animation 
(partnership between the state and market stakeholders).  It is no great surprise that the 
‘third option’ was chosen.  Hillman explains the logic behind this choice: 
               It is less expensive than dirigisme but entails more role for government 
                than laissez-faire.  It creates expectations and political liability but is 
                much less risky than dirigisme.  At best it can realise the flexibility and  
                responsiveness of the market while making sure that things happen faster 
                and that commercially marginal groups are not excluded (33). 
 
All the distinguishing characteristics of TW philosophy are clearly on display here: public-
private sector partnerships, social inclusion (interpreted mainly in  economic/employment 
terms), prudent handling of the public purse and the regulation of the market in the 
interests of all members of society.   Moreover, this intervention in the market through 
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the establishment of UfI learndirect centres is – in spite of the brokerage metaphors - 
quite unlike the marketisation of education and training through the Training and 
Enterprise Councils (TECs) under the Conservatives (Evans,1992) and much more like 
the old statist forms of ‘supply-side’ interventions  (Robertson,1999). 
    A broadly similar strategy informed the organisation of New Deal WtW schemes 
(described by Hodgson & Spours [1999:49] as the ‘central pillar of New Labour’s overall 
political approach for this Parliament’) which allowed for consortia – involving the 
regional employment services, local authorities, careers services, colleges, training and 
enterprise councils, voluntary and private sector agencies – to collaborate in planning 
and delivering WtW provision (Hyland,1999).   There was a commitment to flexibility and 
an expectation that ‘arrangements for delivery would vary from area to area in 
accordance with the views of the local partners and the needs of the young people in the 
area (DfEE, 1997:3).  Although there are now a number of different New Deal schemes 
in operation (for lone parents, people over 50, communities) the flagship WtW project 
was aimed principally at ‘reducing the number of 18-24 year olds experiencing long-term 
unemployment…estimated to be 250,000 nationally in May 1997’(Mason,1998:176).  
People within the age range who have been in receipt of Job Seeker’s  Allowance (JSA) 
for six months or more are referred to a Gateway programme – an intensive period of 
assessment, guidance and counselling – from which they are directed into one of four 
main options: unsubsidised employment, subsidised work in the voluntary sector or with 
the environmental task force, full-time education and training or self-employment 
(DfEE,1997:14-18).    
    An overriding priority of WtW schemes for 18-24 year olds is the placement of as 
many young people as possible into unsubsidised jobs – 40%  of Gateway leavers is the 
official minimum target (and the achieved target is around 43%; Hyland, 2000) – and 
failure to attend Gateway sessions or take up one of the options can be penalised by the 
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suspension of young people’s JSA benefits.  The government is adamant that there will 
be ‘no fifth option of an inactive life on benefit’ (Finn,1997:248).  Elements of patriarchal 
morality and coercion are in evidence here as, indeed, they are in the government’s 
general philosophy of lifelong learning (Ecclestone,2000) though, as Tuckett has argued 
recently, there is such a thing as ‘benign compulsion’ in the public sphere in relation to 
health and the environment as well as to learning (Utley,2001a:4).   It is also worth 
noting here that a key difference between the former Conservative and the current 
Labour perspectives on the ultimate purposes of the learning society is that the former 
viewed learning for economic competitiveness as an end in itself (see, for instance, DTI, 
1994,1995) – justified in terms of a self-sustaining and successful market – whereas the 
latter policies (though accepting the economic imperative) almost always make 
connections between economic aims and the further end of fostering the personal 
development of individuals and wider social cohesion (e.g.,DfEE,1998a:10-11; 
DfEE,2000b: 8-9). 
    WtW projects are, of course, central to New Labour’s general policies for welfare 
reform aimed at challenging the dependency culture and radically transforming the 
welfare state – through what Giddens terms ‘positive welfare’ – which means ‘attacking 
problems of dependency, isolation and lack of self-fulfilment wherever they 
arise’(2000:166).  Thus, the work relief elements of the New Deal need to be located 
within the broader framework – typified by programmes for the long-term unemployed, 
lone parents and the ‘new deal for communities’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998) – of 
welfare reform which is a ‘key part of third way political philosophy’ (Giddens,2000:103). 
     Drawing on the work of Levitas (1998), Fairclough claims that – in terms of the 
language and politics of social exclusion/inclusion – New Labour has abandoned the old 
‘redistributionist discourse’ in favour of  a combination of social integrationist and moral 
underclass conceptions. The former ‘sees  exclusion as primarily due to unemployment 
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and inclusion as getting people into paid work’, whereas the latter ‘attributes exclusion to 
deficiencies in the culture of the excluded and inclusion as entailing cultural change’ 
(Fairclough,2000:57).  In response to such interpretations, Giddens (2000:103) insists 
that the old redistributionist policies – along with the old welfare state – are 
unsustainable because the ‘dynamics of inequality are different from the past’.  The 
mechanisms of social exclusion/inclusion are now to be located in transformations in the 
nature of work, employability requirements and the shifting of welfare systems so as to 
benefit the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of society.        
    Although there are a number of  shortcomings in WtW schemes (Hyland,2000),  the 
New Deal for 18 to 24 year olds had, by the end of August 2000, managed to find work 
for 229,600 youngsters (Educa,2000a:5) and gone some way towards establishing itself 
as a ‘serious programme designed to address unemployment and marginalization for a 
vulnerable group of people’(Hodgson & Spours,1999:65).  In addition, the social 
inclusion agenda of New Labour’s lifelong learning policy – aimed at bridging the 
‘learning divide between those who have benefited from education and training and 
those who have not’ (DfEE,1998a:11) – has resulted in a range of initiatives for poorer 
students in further education, homeless people (Educa,1999) and schemes to expand 
access to higher education for disadvantaged youngsters (DfEE,2000b).  None of this is 
enough, of course, but there is no such thing as a ‘quick fix’ in this area since ‘social 
inclusion policies are going to have to be sustained year after year’ (Twining,2000b:1) to 
have any lasting or substantial impact.  What needs to be added to this is that ‘workfare’ 
programmes like WtW are, almost by definition, short-term, transitional and limited in 
scope (Ormerod,1999). 
Education, Social Capital and Community 
    Notwithstanding all this, there are unmistakable social democratic principles at work in 
New Labour’s social inclusion educational agenda (a concession made even by 
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trenchant critics of New Labour policy such as Hill, 2000:11). How significant are such 
principles in terms of overall education policy?   It needs to be said that the socio-ethical 
strands of educational policy are – in terms of both theory and practice, rhetoric and 
reality –  unequivocally subordinate to the economistic aims.  The social inclusion strand 
is invariably paired with the employabilty/workforce skills element of policy: learning 
secures ‘our economic future’ and ‘develops the spiritual side of our lives and promotes 
active citizenship (DfEE,1998a:7), skills policy is designed to foster ‘economic prosperity 
and social cohesion’ (DfEE,2000a:3). However, even though the social purposes are 
usually placed second, the fact that the links are always made is more than symbolic.   
     When Giddens (2000:73) argues that ‘a strong economy presumes a strong society’ 
and follows this up by stressing that the ‘key force in human capital development 
obviously has to be education since it can ‘foster both economic efficiency and civic 
cohesion’, the TW underpinnings of current education policy are laid bare.   There is 
clearly an active role to be played in New Labour learning policy by what  Schuller & 
Field (1998:234) call ‘social capital’ which is ‘located in the kinds of context and culture 
which promote communication and mutual learning as part of the fabric of everyday life’.  
The ‘cultivation of social capital is integral to the knowledge economy’, Giddens 
(2000:78) tells us, and adds that the ‘new individualism that goes along with 
globalization is not refractory to cooperation and collaboration – cooperation (rather than 
hierarchy) is positively stimulated by it’.  All this is explained in terms of the fact that: 
                Social capital refers to the trust networks that individuals can draw 
                upon for social support, just as financial capital can be drawn upon  
                to be used for investment.  Like financial capital, social capital can 
                be expanded – invested and reinvested (ibid:78). 
 
    The critics of current PCET policy (Hill,2000; Rikowski,2000; Coffield,1998) argue that 
– through WtW projects, UfI learndirect services and Individual Learning Accounts (ILAs) 
- there is still too much emphasis placed on individual rather than collective responsibility 
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for learning, often in a way which frustrates other aspects of the TW social inclusion 
agenda. As Ainley’s (1999:196) passionate condemnation of this aspect of policy puts it: 
                   In the ‘learning society’ corresponding to the new learning policy, 
                   both knowledge and skill are individualised and limited for the majority 
                   of an increasingly peripheral workforce to portfolios of lower-level 
                   vocational information and competence, while learning is separated  
                   from leisure and popular culture.  
 
This is, indeed, a damning critique when levelled against a group of policies within  
which community involvement and social inclusion are meant to have a significant (if, at 
times, a subordinate)  place.    
    Accepting the rhetoric/reality gap, Fairclough (2000) points to the influence of 
‘communitarian discourse’ on Tony Blair’s policy statements, suggesting that it 
‘combines Christian socialism and a conservative critique of the individualistic world view 
of liberalism’(37-8).  One of the leading theorists in communitarian philosophy is Etzioni 
(1995) – according to Levitas (1998), the principal influence on New Labour thinking in 
general and Blair’s ideas in particular – whose key principles have been placed in an 
educational context recently by Arthur (1998).  The main agenda is founded on the belief 
that: 
               Neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long 
               outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which we all 
               belong.  Nor can any community long survive unless its members dedicate  
               some of their attention , energy and resources to shared projects.  The exclusive 
               pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which 
               we all depend (358-9). 
 
      Is any of this communitarianism reflected in TW education policy?  Certainly, the 
spirit is well represented in the broad social inclusion and widening participation agenda, 
and the drive to encourage collaboration rather than competition whilst broadening 
community representation can be seen in the new rules for the governance of further 
education colleges (DfEE,1998c). If  concrete manifestations of communitarianism are 
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more difficult to detect, perhaps this is because the reconciliation of social justice with 
global markets is just very difficult to achieve.             
    The Prime Minister has recently attempted to link New Deal initiatives with the Human 
Rights Act, suggesting that the two strands need to be synthesised in constructing the: 
          important dimension of the debate about the Third Way…between  
          collective action in the pursuit of  social justice and the liberal commitment 
          to individual freedom in a market economy (Blair,2000:21). 
 
Can such a synthesis realistically be achieved within a 21st century social democracy? 
The Third Way, Education and the State 
    Whitfield (2000:82) argues that New Labour’s ‘third way modernisation project is 
based on a minimum reversal of Tory legislation…the continuation of the Conservatives’ 
transformation of public services’.   Continuities between the former Tory administration 
and New Labour strategies have provided dominant themes in post-1997 educational 
policy studies. The TW reliance on human capital tenets is said to be ‘embarrassingly 
close to the position taken within many education reports flowing from previous 
Conservative administrations’ (Rikowski, 2000:6) and  Esland et al (1999:2) have 
observed that the ‘neo-liberal promotion of free market economic globalisation has 
continued to provide the overarching framework for Britain’s political economy as it 
enters the new millennium’. 
     A lot of this appears to be, more or less, on the right lines but it requires further 
analysis and elaboration.  Does it make sense, for instance, to speak of free market 
globalization as something that can be promoted, or is it something to which all 
governments simply have to respond?  Ball (1999:195) is inclined towards the latter in 
his argument for: 
            the need to see the policy continuities between the Conservatives and 
            Labour in an international context and…that in a sense Labour’s policies 
            are not specific to Labour at all;  they are local manifestations of global 
            policy paradigms. 
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    Fairclough (2000:16) similarly suggests – in accounting for the rhetoric-reality gap in 
contemporary political discourse – that New Labour is seeking to ‘achieve rhetorically 
what they cannot achieve…in reality…a reconciliation of neo-liberal enterprise with 
social justice’. 
      The view that we are helpless in the face of globalization forces has, however, been 
subjected to serious criticism in recent years.  Green (1997), for example, argues that it 
is internationalization rather than globalization that faces contemporary systems ,and 
that the prime task for educationalists is to ‘reconstruct cultures of citizenship and 
nationhood in ways which are appropriate to modern conditions’(186).  In a similar way – 
though addressing different questions – Giddens (1998:129) urges social democrats to 
‘seek a new role for the nation in a cosmopolitan world’.  In more recent TW analyses, 
Giddens (2000) – making liberal use of Etzioni’s communitarian ideas – argues that 
‘globalization creates favourable conditions for the renewal of communities’ and that ‘civil 
society is fundamental to constraining the power of both markets and government’(63-4).   
     There are a number of fundamental misconceptions about the links between 
nationhood, neo-liberalism and global markets which Gray (1998) seeks to remedy in the 
assertion that the contemporary ‘model of globalization errs badly in writing off sovereign 
states as marginal institutions’.  He goes on to argue that: 
           For multinationals, sovereign states are not marginal actors in the world 
            economy whose policies are easily circumvented.  They are key players 
            whose power is well worth courting.  The leverage of sovereign states 
            may actually be greater in some respects today than it has been in the past (69). 
 
Many of the misunderstandings surrounding globalization are caused by mistaken views 
about markets, liberalism and the role of governments. As Gray explains, the so-called 
free market: 
             is not – as today’s economic philosophy supposes – a natural state of affairs 
             which comes about when political interference with market exchange has 
             been removed.  In any long and broad historical perspective the free market 
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             is a rare and short-lived aberration.  Regulated markets are the norm, arising 
             spontaneously in the life of every society.  The free market is a construction  
             of state power (ibid:211).  
    There are, in fact, only two periods when a genuinely laissez-faire regime within a 
global market framework existed: in Britain in the 1840s to 1870s and in the USA, Britain 
and, significantly, New Zealand in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Moreover, as Gray 
explains, even these markets could not have been brought about without active state 
intervention in the fields of industrial relations, the deregulation of the labour market and 
a  generally proactive fiscal policy . Gray’s claim that, from the 1870s  to 1914, a spate of 
reforms was implemented in Britain – typified by what Taylor (1972:57) called the 
‘patently interventionist 1870 Education Act’ – with the aim of ‘limiting market freedoms 
for the sake of social cohesion’ (1998:14) serves to illuminate much of current New 
Labour policy.   
    British educational history from 1870 to the First World War was characterised by 
intensive and far-reaching state intervention (Wardle,1976).  As Sanderson (1999:26) 
observes:   
                it can be argued that the British system of education was so transformed 
                between 1870 and 1914 and especially between 1890 and 1914 that it had 
                become an impressive support for industry rather than a liability. 
 
These arguments are meant to counter mainstream claims that the economic decline of 
Britain in the last quarter of the 19th century – particularly after Britain’s poor 
performance at the 1867 Paris Exhibition and the subsequent spate of government 
enquiries into the state of technical education (Musgrave,1970) – was caused by our 
educational shortcomings.   Ashby (1958:50), for example, suggested that ‘formal 
education was a negligible factor’ in Britain’s industrial strength, a view echoed by Dore 
(1976).  Yet, as Coffey (1992:50) has noted, the 1870 Elementary Education Act had 
‘primarily an economic purpose’  and – in introducing the Bill in the House of Commons 
in February 1870 -  Forster declared that ‘upon the speedy provision of elementary 
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education depends our industrial prosperity’ (Maclure,1973:99-100). Reinforcing this 
general line of argument, Sanderson (1999:29) asserts that: 
             Before 1890 English education was defective, lacking a proper structure 
             of universities, state and local government finance, technical colleges, free 
             and compulsory elementary education or popular secondary education… 
             After 1890, however, the situation was transformed with free and compulsory 
             elementary education, the restructuring of the secondary system…the elevation 
             of civic university colleges into independent degree granting institutions with  
             state grants from 1889, the spread of the polytechnics, municipal technical 
             colleges and City & Guilds examinations… 
 
    There are clear parallels between this end of the 19th century state interventionism in 
education and New Labour’s lifelong learning policies implemented at the end of the 20th 
century.  In spite of the lack of evidence about general social – as opposed to individual 
– rates of return to investment in education and training (Murphy,1993; Dore,1997), 
investment in education is once again proposed as a panacea for all kinds of economic 
and social ills.  There is also, of course, the fact that – whereas the educational system 
is amenable to reform with the possibility of immediate and tangible results – the 
economy and general social order are not quite so malleable.  However, the pace of 
reform between 1997 and 2000 has been formidable and can only be characterised in 
terms of its centralist and interventionist tendencies (Selwyn,2000; Avis,2000). 
    Hodgson & Spours’ (1999:136) analysis of recent education policy concludes with a 
criticism of New Labour for ‘its reliance on voluntarist initiatives which, while practical 
and focused on the needs of the excluded, may not in the final analysis work effectively 
because of system barriers’.  In terms of government interventions, a distinction is made 
between ‘weak frameworks’ which place ‘responsibility on individuals to access the type 
of learning opportunities they require to improve employability and enter the labour 
market’, and ‘strong frameworks ‘ which ‘provide structures within the education and 
training system which support genuine individual empowerment’ (ibid:137).  The UfI and 
voluntary employer training policies are cited as instances of  the ‘weak’ approach, 
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whereas a unified post-16 funding system, a unified curriculum and a strengthened 
national framework for Modern Apprenticeships are examples of ‘strong’ approaches 
(changes in Modern Apprenticeships are now an integral part of the new skills agenda; 
DfEE,2000a:10-11). 
     This is an interesting analysis though it leaves much to be said.  New Deal WtW 
schemes are not mentioned specifically in this context but – on any reading – such 
workfare programmes can only be characterised as strong interventionist policies 
designed to remedy social exclusion and disadvantage.  Moreover, could it not be said 
that the Curriculum 2000 proposals aimed at post-16 qualification reform and  the 
forthcoming wholesale re-organisation of the PCET sector under the Learning and Skills 
Council (Educa, 2000b:4) are paradigm examples of strong, centralist policies?   And 
similar claims might be made about recent policies aimed at helping the most 
disadvantaged students in further and higher education.  
    A plausible explanation of the differential and sometimes contradictory analyses of  
TW educational policy is that, for critics of neo-liberalism, state interventions are almost 
never enough, whereas for critics of statist polices, any government intervention smacks 
too much of centralist control.  Green’s (1990) investigation of the role of education 
systems in state formation demonstrated that there is no such thing as a state which 
does not manipulate its education system in the pursuit of certain ends;  there are only 
relative degrees of manipulation and control.  Given all this, perhaps an additional role 
for TW policy is to try to steer a (necessarily circuitous) path between the Scylla of  
voluntarism and the Charybdis of coercion in PCET policy.   Contemporary lifelong 
learning policy is, arguably, currently weighted towards the latter rather than the former 
course of action.  
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Conclusion 
    New Labour PCET policy in general and TW strategies in particular cannot – without 
qualification and circumspection - be described as neo-liberal.  Such policy is more 
accurately classified as being representative of a teleology of economic activity 
determined by a range of wider social and cultural purposes which was explained by 
Robbins (1952) through the use of the German concept of ‘Harmonielehre’.   If current 
political strategies appear to more to do with economic than social capital, then this can 
be explained in terms of the need to respond to both the ideological legacy of the New 
Right and the globalizing forces which generate the diversity of neo-liberal attempts to 
reconcile the oppositional forces which TW politics is designed to address.  New Labour 
education policy is more centralist than that of the previous Conservative administration 
and, moreover, needs to be so to develop the strong frameworks which, as Ainley (1999) 
and Hodgson & Spours (1999) argue, are essential to the development of lifelong 
learning policies based on democracy and social justice.  Academics and researchers 
who are quick to attack the centralism of New Labour in relation to curriculum policy 
(Wragg,1998), lifelong learning initiatives (Tight,1998; Ecclestone,2000) or educational 
research (Walford,2000; Utley,2001b) might do well to reflect on the question of exactly 
how much state direction is required to enable schools and colleges to fight social 
exclusion and promote genuine community participation and equality of opportunity at all 
levels.  
                                                   ***************** 
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